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Abstract
This article discusses concepts of legitimacy and elite capture in locally led development through a case study of the
Pacific-based Green Growth Leaders’ Coalition (GGLC). GGLC is a fellowship of persons identified for their developmental
leadership potential on issues of sustainability and economic growth. Members are recruited into an exclusive grouping
dedicated to influencing positive developmental change through informal networks and political backchannels. With their
membership representing people who both self-identify and are locally recognised as leaders, queries exist to the extent
to which their efforts represent a shift towards greater ownership of developmental processes at local levels or simply
reinforce elite capture of ‘local voice’ in the most aid-dependent region in the world. Rather than necessarily offering
straightforward answers to questions of legitimacy and elite capture, the example of GGLC demonstrates how complex
the notion of locally led development can be in practice.
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1. Introduction
Definitions of local leadership in development discourse
are quite broad. For example, in Booth and Unsworth’s
influential article, ‘Politically smart, locally led develop-
ment,’ the authors note that their conception of locally
led projects are those that are owned, negotiated and
delivered by “locals (broadly defined) [who] are more
likely than outsiders to have the motivation, credibility,
knowledge and networks to mobilise support, leverage
relationships and seize opportunities” (2014, p. 13). This
broad definition focuses on those with sufficient politi-
cal capital to gather the support of donors, policymakers
and others who can implement reforms, whether also
local or outsider. Beyond general characteristics no dis-
tinctions are made, such as between wealthy, educated,
urban people and those living subsistence lives in rural
areas. Although there is a clear implication that local
leadership consists of those individuals or coalitions with
a grounded understanding of the lived realities of local
peoples, this is not explicitly stated.
Surprisingly little has beenwritten of where concepts
of local leadership and grassroots leadership may con-
flict or overlap. Local leadership connotes connection of
the leader to understandings of the livelihoods needs
and political economy of local spaces but bypasses dis-
cussion of how deep this connection runs and how le-
gitimacy is demonstrated at the grassroots level. This is
not to say that this matter has not been addressed at
all. Mohan and Stokke, for example, critique “the new lo-
calism in development studies [which] has tended to es-
sentialise the local as discrete places that host relatively
homogeneous communities or, alternatively, constitute
sites of grassroots mobilisation and resistance” (2000,
p. 264) and argue for deeper understandings of the polit-
ical economy of local spaces. Another space where these
ideas are discussed is in McGuinness’ edited volume,
Local First: Development for the Twenty-First Century
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(2012). Rather than writing of development that is lo-
cally led, owned or delivered the authors instead refer to
‘Local First’ practices that acknowledge power differen-
tials not only between donor agencies and international
Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) on one side and
a generic conception of the ‘local’ on the other, but also
at the local level. Hayman, particularly, writes of Local
First development practices as incorporating not only
central governments but also “coordinated but pluralis-
tic provision by a range of local organisations—NGOs, en-
trepreneurs, lower tiers of government and other forms
of citizen association for the remainder” (Hayman, 2012).
In this article, I interrogate notions of legitimacy and
representation in relation to locally led development.
To illustrate my argument, I draw on the example of
the Green Growth Leaders’ Coalition (GGLC). GGLC is
an invitation-only fellowship of like-minded individuals
living and working in the Pacific islands’ region seek-
ing to collaborate on strategies for advancing a vision
of economic growth and development that is environ-
mentally sustainable and amplifies Pacific cultural val-
ues. Drawing its members from high offices in govern-
ment, development organisations, faith-based organi-
sations, academia, the private sector and civil society
groups, it is a prime example of an elite, locally led de-
velopment initiative.
The article is divided into five sections. First, I discuss
literature related to the extent to which local elites are
seen to enhance or impede the widespread dispersion
of benefits related to development interventions. I then
provide information about GGLC, including its member-
ship composition, to contextualise its operations as a
locally led development initiative as well as the action
research method by which I collected data. Next, I en-
gage literature that discusses how leadership is contem-
porarily and historically conceptualised in the Pacific is-
lands’ region, including reference to literature on com-
mon traits of leadership in countries with small popula-
tions. I then use the case of GGLC to problematise the
potential for a singular vision of what constitutes locally
led development, as well as the role of elites in driving or
impeding developmental gains at grassroots level. I con-
clude with reflections on how development donors and
multilateral organisations could improve practices of sup-
porting locally led development in ways that include and
bring benefit to non-elites.
2. Elite Capture in ‘Locally Led’ Development
Interventions
Questions of elite capture in relation to locally led de-
velopment are not new. Cooke and Kothari’s edited vol-
ume, Participation: The New Tyranny? (2001), expressly
challenged notions that development interventions that
espouse values of participation and inclusion are, by na-
ture, participatory and inclusive. As Cornwall (2003) has
noted with regard to the inclusion of women’s voices
in development interventions and Nyamugasira (1998)
of faith placed by Northern NGOs in the capacity of
Southern NGOs to represent local concerns, ideas of par-
ticipation and whose voice counts can and often are
exclusive of all but a small subset of any population.
Mohan (2006), too, has cautioned against conflating the
views of local elites with those affected by development
initiatives at grassroots level. Often it is the opinions and
experiences of well-educated and well-connected men,
in particular, whose voices are privileged as those of
the ‘local.’
Although there are clearly problems of representa-
tion whenever a homogenised subset—whether by gen-
der, education, ethnicity or any other marker—assumes
authority as a voice for a heterogeneous group, it is un-
clear to what extent local elites improve or impede de-
velopmental gains for citizens at grassroots level. There
are those who consider the inclusion of local elite voices
in development planning as inherently problematic, re-
inforcing power imbalances and undermining attempts
to distribute developmental benefits equitably (Lewis
& Hossain, 2008; Paffenholz, 2015; Waheduzzaman,
As-Saber, &Hamid, 2018). Others contend thatwhile this
may be true of some elites, others explicitly work to en-
sure developmental benefits are widespread (Dasgupta
& Beard, 2007; Mansuri & Rao, 2004), and that in-
volving elites in intervention planning and implementa-
tion alongside non-elites can improve social capital for
both groups (Abe, 2009; Lund & Saito-Jensen, 2013).
Platteau (2004) argues that elite capture of projects does
not necessarily mean that the benefits of interventions
are thinly spread, though he advocates for the tight con-
trol of funds release by donors in a manner that runs
counter to principles of locally led development.
Within the scholarship on elite capture in devel-
opment interventions, a growing literature discusses
greater nuance in the participation of elites and
non-elites in achieving long-term change, noting how in-
cluding both can increase social capital and that efforts to
empower non-elites requires commitment to structural
change beyond the parameters of isolated interventions
(Musgrave & Wong, 2016; Rigon, 2014; Sheely, 2015;
Warren & Visser, 2016; Wong, 2010). Wong (2010), in a
comparison of development interventions—one which
excluded local elites from decision-making processes
and another that co-opted their engagement—notes
that while excluding the elite does not diminish their
influence, explicitly utilising their influence risks com-
pounding their power in ways that may negatively im-
pact on non-elites. He notes “the ‘counter-elite’ and ‘co-
opt-elite’ approaches should not be seen as ‘either-or”’
(Wong, 2010, p. 15) and suggests that judicious incorpo-
ration of elite views into development planning in a man-
ner that can critique their perspectives and include non-
elites provides a better blueprint for local participation
both in discrete interventions and in shaping long-term
structural change.Wong’s approachmirrors that of think-
ing and working politically, which recognises that there
are competing interests in any development intervention
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or reform effort, and that while developmental change
requires reforming social and political structures achiev-
ing such reform requires co-opting the will of local peo-
ple of influence (Teskey, 2017; TWP Community, 2016).
It is worth noting that the papers examining elite
participation in development mentioned above tended
to focus on discrete development projects with clear
aims and intended processes. GGLC possesses neither of
these. As I discuss below, its aim is a deliberately broad
vision of an environmentally sustainable, economically
prosperous, sovereign developmental future for Pacific
peoples. It is a development project that does not adhere
to heuristic categories such as ‘big D/little d’ or ‘inten-
tional/immanent’ development but straddles and mud-
dies such categories, exposing their reliance upon one
another (Lewis, 2019).
3. Context: Leaders and the Green Growth Leaders’
Coalition
The discussion in this article of GGLC as an example
of a locally led development initiative is based on data
drawn through an action research project that was
conducted with GGLC that began in 2016. The action
research project was aimed at providing insights and
guidance about the process, logic and achievements of
GGLC to its secretariat based at the International Union
for the Conservation of Nature Oceania office (IUCN),
its’ funder, the Pacific Leadership Program (PLP) and
GGLC, itself. While consent has been provided for the
use of quotations in this article, it has not been pro-
vided for attribution of the quotations so they are com-
pletely deidentified.
GGLC was established in 2012 as a coalition of in-
dividuals sharing a commitment to advancing sustain-
able, locally led development in the Pacific islands’ re-
gion. Membership of GGLC is by invitation from the sec-
retariat based at the IUCN. Members are drawn from
the upper ranks of a cross-section of government, in-
dustry and society. Although the vast majority of mem-
bers are indigenous to Pacific states, this is not a require-
ment of membership. Individual members are identified
and recruited based on two criteria: expected leader-
ship capacity in their fields in the proceeding five years;
and recognition of holding a broad shared outlook with
other members that Pacific peoples should be responsi-
ble for envisioning and enacting their developmental fu-
tures in a way that is environmentally sustainable. The
latter criterion is fundamental to the ambitions of GGLC.
There is a recognition from members of a mission-like
shared sense of purpose, with members remarking to
me that this transcended differences of nationality, work-
place affiliation and even philosophical outlooks. This
shared sense of purpose for driving locally led develop-
ment in the Pacific is an extension of previous articula-
tions by seminal Pacific thinkers such as Wendt (1976),
Hau’ofa (1994) and Crocombe, who stated: “Pacific peo-
ple are not only entitled to, but obliged to, be actively in-
volved to the fullest possible extent in shaping their own
future” (Crocombe, 1975, p. 1).
Unlike East Asian concepts of green growth that are
tied to attempts to use technology to improve a dou-
ble bottom line of economic growth and environmental
sustainability (Kim & Thurbon, 2015; Moon, 2010), the
GGLC approach to green growth is one that seeks to ap-
ply Pacific cultural values of environmental stewardship
and sovereignty to achieve livelihood benefits for Pacific
peoples (Dornan, Morgan, Newton Cain, & Tarte, 2018).
Governed by the IUCN and funded by the Australian Aid
program through the PLP, it facilitated annual meetings
at multi-day retreats for members from 2012 until fund-
ing ceased with the closure of PLP at the end of 2017.
These annual meetings allowed for multi-day conversa-
tions utilising the Pacific talanoa method that allows
for emergent discussion with no fixed agenda (Halapua,
2000). As has been discussed elsewhere (Craney &
Hudson, 2020), annual meetings provided an opportu-
nity for members to consult with one another regard-
ing development successes and challenges under the
Chatham House rule (Chatham House, n.d.). One mem-
ber described the benefit of the retreat format to me,
saying, “It’s not about networking…you network because
of an opportunity….The talanoa is about building trust.”
The meetings also provided a space where members
could set individual goals for how they individually hoped
to progress locally led, sustainable development in the
periods between annual meetings.
The action research approach took the form of an
insider/outsider relationship (O’Keefe et al., 2014) with
members of a three-person research team embedded in
GGLC as participants, providing feedback to GGLC mem-
bers, the secretariat and the donor. The purpose for
the action research project was threefold: Monitoring
the process and outcomes of the Coalition to the donor,
documenting these processes and outcomes for insights
to academic and practitioner development audiences,
and providing critical feedback to the secretariat on how
GGLC members understood the Coalition to function
and their roles within it. Fundamental to the project
was attendance at the 2016 and 2017 annual meetings
in Fiji and Tonga, where I conducted formal and infor-
mal interviews with members. Attendance at the annual
meetings allowed me to observe the frank discussion
of members in the talanoa and contribute when called
upon, reflecting upon themes that I had identified dur-
ing the talanoa and through the process of the action re-
search project in between meetings. Outside of the for-
mal talanoa space I was able to develop rapport with
Coalition members and have discussions that touched
upon themes including their ideas for Pacific-led devel-
opment, and the role and function of GGLC in achieving
Pacific-led development.
Research continued beyond the annual meetings.
During 2016 and 2017 the research team regularly
engaged with Coalition members through face-to-face
meetings, phone calls and emails asking for feedback
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on GGLC as a concept and its processes, as well as a
survey instrument to track how they were progressing
with their individual goals for advancing locally led, sus-
tainable development. The depth of my engagement
with members outside of annual meetings was largely
dictated by the members, themselves, and the time
that they had available within their typically busy sched-
ules. Communication of preliminary findings, feedback
from GGLC members and suggestions for improvements
basedon thesewere relayedon a regular basis to PLP and
IUCN. Although GGLC has not formally dissolved, its op-
erations have slowed to dormancy since funding ceased
at the end of 2017. As a result, the action research pro-
cess has naturally slowed, too, though the research team
continue communication with IUCN and individual mem-
bers on an ad hoc basis. GGLC is discussed in this article
in the present tense as this is how the coremembers con-
tinue to discuss the initiative, reflecting their intention to
revive the project in the future.
A defining feature of GGLC is that it operates through
a hands-off process. It does not take an active role in facil-
itating development interventions nor proposing frame-
works or planning documents. Its preferred method of
influencing developmental change is through members
utilising their personal and professional networks to
shape how decision-makers inside governments, donor
agencies and development organisations approach de-
velopment interventions. To this end, it has claimed
some success in influencing formal development plans
at national and sub-national level in parts of the Pacific
region amongst other measures, though its arms-length
approach means that the causal effect of GGLC involve-
ment in achieving these outcomes is unclear (Craney &
Hudson, 2020).
A particularly salient characteristic of GGLC’s hands-
off approach to influencing positive developmental
change is that it turns the conventional diplomacy-
development relationship on its head. International de-
velopment policies and programs are regularly used
to achieve diplomatic ends. Hillary Clinton has noted
that “diplomatic objectives are often secured by gains
in development” (2010, p. 14), while bilateral inter-
national development agencies in countries such as
Australia and Canada have been absorbed by their for-
eign affairs departments under the guise of integra-
tion though more accurately representing assimilation
(Yanguas, 2018, pp. 51–54). Although there is recogni-
tion of the growing role of development actors oper-
ating in diplomatic spaces (Constantinou & Der Derian,
2010) and a growing community of academics and practi-
tioners advocating for applying political economic under-
standings to interventions (Hudson & Marquette, 2015;
McCulloch & Piron, 2019; Teskey, 2017; TWP Community,
2016), there is scant evidence of development initiatives
centring diplomatic approaches of relationship-building
and networking as a core tactic. Of course, development
actors do employ these tactics in their ongoing engage-
mentwith donors and other development actors, but net-
working ismore generally used as a tool rather than a fun-
damental method of development work. For GGLC, how-
ever, networking and relationship-building is central both
to how individual leaders are identified for membership,
and the hands-off approach to influence that they favour.
Unlike bureaucratic interventions that connote the
absence of politics and may avoid being critical of gov-
ernments and implementing agencies (Ferguson, 1994),
GGLC is highly political in its processes. Indeed, its ap-
proach of utilising personal and professional networks
to attempt to effect change is a prime example of think-
ing and working politically (Leftwich, 2011). And while
GGLC has not engaged in direct development interven-
tions, nor even made public statements about positions
that members hold, it is steadfast in its goal of Pacific-led
environmentally sustainable development. Even when
dealing with its major donor, GGLC asserted that locally
led development required independence of thought, pro-
cess and direction. That members participated in GGLC
voluntarily in a way that did not risk the other social and
professional positions that they held allowed members
to assert independence and ensured that neither indi-
vidual members nor the will of the collective was obse-
quious to the donor (Craney & Hudson, 2020).
4. Local Leadership in the Pacific
By its very nature of being an invitation-only collective
consisting of people identified as current and future de-
velopmental leaders, the membership of GGLC reflects
elitism. In a region marked by social processes dictated
by hierarchy—traditionally through chiefly and big man
systems—it is important to understand the role of elites
in leadership processes in the Pacific. Chiefs, big men, el-
ders, nobles and people holding offices of power are gen-
erally held in high esteem throughout the region. Large-
scale policy and social reformplanning needs the support
of these people to have any hope of success.
On the surface this may appear to be a particu-
larly undemocratic approach to leadership. As an Asian
Development Bank report on Pacific governance from
2004 reads:
The modern and traditional systems of governance
coexist uneasily. Whereas the former advocates indi-
vidual merit, neutrality, equal participation, and the
rights of the individual and the nuclear family, the lat-
ter demands priority and loyalty for kin and commu-
nity, consensual and consultative values within the
chief/“big men” traditional hierarchy, and tradition-
ally defined roles for men and women. (Mellor &
Jabes, 2004, p. 16)
This viewpoint, whileworded in a seemingly neutralman-
ner, carries connotations of a deficit of critical civic en-
gagement within Pacific cultures. It fails to acknowledge
both the widespread social support for traditional gover-
nance systems and also the range of socio-cultural mea-
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 4, Pages 191–200 194
sures of accountability that exist to support these sys-
tems. For example, of traditional Fijian governance prac-
tices, Ravuvu (1983, 1991) has written that they were
highly democratic prior to European arrival, with chiefs
being deposed if they failed to consult with and pro-
vide for their people. Fox (1967) has noted similar cus-
toms in Solomon Islands. Further, Ravuvu (1988) noted
that the oppositional approach to politics that marks
most Western liberal democracies is counterintuitive to
traditional processes of decision-making and civic en-
gagement in Pacific cultures. Members of the commu-
nity seek to support leaders once a decision has been
reached rather than seeking to expose flaws in the de-
sign or implementation of initiatives.
Claims that the Pacific is home to somewhat idyl-
lic relations between leaders and the general public
are not universally accepted, however. For example,
Lawson (1996) has critiqued Ravuvu’s claims of endoge-
nous deliberative democracy as a wilfully naïve mis-
representation of consensus as a proxy for democracy
that ignores how leaders can impose their influence.
Lawson (1996) and Huffer (2005) have also commented
that as many Pacific states gained sovereignty, elite
classes co-opted colonial institutions that presented a
façade of being democratic to buttress their own inter-
ests. Corbett (2015a) has noted that public perception
of political leaders in the Pacific has also shifted from
one of reverence in the 1960s and 1970s as more coun-
tries became independent to onewhere such leaders are
now more likely to be associated with corruption and
nepotism—a stereotype that he remarks does not ade-
quately capture the good intentions that motivate most
Pacific politicians and the challenges they face in achiev-
ing positive reforms in countries with small economies
and limited bureaucracies. Perhaps the best articulation
of the complexity of Pacific governance is provided by
Duncan (2014), who notes: “The culture of the Pacific
presents challenges to those attempting to bring about
change. Communal and egalitarian values are held very
strongly; although to an outsider, this sits oddly with the
power that the elite hold within communities.”
Part of the challenge in understanding the role of
elites as development enablers or inhibitors in the Pacific
in comparison to other parts of the world relates to
the social closeness that marks relations of elites and
non-elites. Even as systems designed to replicate lib-
eral democracies become more embedded in Pacific
societies and change how leadership is practiced, the
smallness of Pacific states presents greater opportunity
for connection between leaders and the general pub-
lic (Teaiwa, 2005). This is a phenomenon that Corbett
and Veenendaal have noted of politics in small states,
writing, “Politicians are more than just legislators: They
are family or clan members, friends, neighbours, or col-
leagues” (2019, p. 7). With all Pacific states, except for
Papua New Guinea (PNG), considered to be small states
due to having populations of less than one million peo-
ple, the impact of interpersonal relationships in terms
of governance and leadership may result in deeper un-
derstandings of the needs of people across boundaries
of class, wealth and other social indicators (Corbett &
Veenendaal, 2018). Closeness of social ties arguably pro-
vides a layer of social accountability not possible in larger
states in exposing leaders to the realities of everyday life
for the general populace and in limiting their willingness
to fracture social bonds.
This is not to suggest that the picture of leadership
in the Pacific is uniformly utopic. Instances of civil un-
rest ranging from riots to civil conflict have been evident
across the region in countries including Fiji, Kanaky/New
Caledonia, PNG, Solomon Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu in
the short period of the 21st century to date. The com-
mon theme across all of these instances being a lack
of livelihood opportunities and access to resources (Lee
& Craney, 2019; Teaiwa, 2005). The necessary break-
down of political and social leadership at the time of
these instances demonstrates that while the smallness
of their populations may limit issues of social distance,
institutions and leaders are not immune to criticism in
these societies.
It needs to be noted that closer social ties do not
equal shared backgrounds and struggles. Hau’ofa (2008)
noted characteristics associated with a Pacific social
elite across politics, business and civil society that de-
lineates members from the broader public. He wrote:
“The ruling classes of the South Pacific are increasingly
culturally homogenous: they speak the same language,
which is English [and] they share the same ideologies
and the same material lifestyles” (Hau’ofa, 2008, p. 13).
Consisting mostly of individuals with English-language
university educations who operate as heads of govern-
ment ministries, multilateral organisations, private cor-
porations and beyond, Hau’ofa would likely apply this la-
bel to the members of GGLC. Although the elites that
Hau’ofa wrote of were not limited to politics, parallels
certainly exist between these elites and the politicians in
small states that Veenendaal and Corbett argue utilise
their “higher levels of education than the average citi-
zen…to control the policy agenda” (2015, p. 539).
Local leadership in the Pacific can be seen to have fun-
damentally democratic traits but also be emboldened by
distinct differences between elites and non-elites. Pacific
leaders operate in a liminal space where they can be al-
ternatively and simultaneously be seen as elites and/or
trustedmembers of their communities.Whether relating
to thosewith traditional hereditary titles or the emerging
cosmopolitan global citizen, lesser social distance is evi-
dent in Pacific societies through the closeness dictated
by their small sizes while greater social distance is per-
petuated through differences in wealth, education and
access to decision-making power, as well as the contin-
uation of traditional practices of hierarchical deference.
As Corbett (2015b) notes, leadership in the Pacific is very
much the domain of elites.
The elitism of GGLC membership is not necessarily
contradictory to it being genuinely locally led. Indeed,
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the vast majority of its members are citizens of Pacific
states who have crafted careers based on their capac-
ity to lead development institutions in the private, pub-
lic and civil society sectors at sub-national, national, sub-
regional and regional levels. If one were seeking exam-
ples of local development leaders in the Pacific each one
of GGLC’s members would be suitable for selection. The
fact that the members of GGLC would be considered ex-
emplars of local leadership in the Pacific does, however,
beg questions of whether developmental leadership can
or should be the domain only of elites.
5. Discussion: Problematising Locally Led Development
through the Example of GGLC
The GGLC offers a particularly rich and complex case
study for interrogating the risk of locally led develop-
ment interventions falling prey to elite interests. On one
hand the members of GGLC represent the epitome of an
unrepresentative elite disconnected from the everyday
livelihoods and poverty pressures that development has
customarily been focused upon. GGLC is an invitation-
only group displaying all of the traits of Hau’ofa’s new so-
cial elite through its members’ educations, professions
and mobility. Further, its concerns for reshaping how
development is conceived and practiced in the region
are based on long-term visions that are the privilege
of people not concerned with how they will put food
on the table or uniforms on the backs of their school-
aged children. On the other hand, the members of GGLC
come from a region marked by small populations and so-
cial closeness where hierarchy and representative lead-
ership are not seen as anathema, andwhere accountabil-
ity is addressed at street level or around the kava bowl
on an ongoing basis. This reflects long-established norms
of deliberatively democratic and representative civic en-
gagement for Pacific peoples.
As heads of government ministries, industries, NGOs
andmore theGGLC certainly consists of the elitewhile re-
maining clearly locally led. In fact, GGLC represents what
McCulloch and Piron (2019) identify as themost genuine
form of local leadership in that it is an initiative that is
entirely locally driven. GGLC was created by local peo-
ple operating to a vision that they created through pro-
cesses that they determined. Their commitment to ad-
hering to their own vision of development and working
through influence rather than distinct acts that demon-
strate simpler lines of causality remained steadfast even
when ongoing funding was at risk (Craney & Hudson,
2020). It is important to note that the members of GGLC
do not explicitly refer to themselves as ‘locals,’ though
they do position themselves as such within conversa-
tions by discussing how Pacific values and ways of work-
ing compare and contrast with those of foreign govern-
ments and development agencies. Reflecting on the qual-
ity of discussion possible utilising talanoa as opposed
to meetings with strict agendas, one member remarked
that it was “conducive for greater, more intimate discus-
sions. People spoke more freely, they felt more comfort-
able, there was an air of respect for one another. It was
very Pacific. Everythingwas very Pacific and I appreciated
that.” Although they are important for being able to artic-
ulate ways of working that complement or contrast with
development orthodoxy, concepts such as ‘locally led de-
velopment’ should be acknowledged as outside imposi-
tions from the development community onto communi-
ties in receipt of development funding and assistance.
The greater question regarding the legitimacy of
GGLC applies to the extent to which locally led devel-
opment should represent grassroots developmental con-
cerns. Development programs, policies and projects may
be more efficiently implemented and have better results
if they incorporate locals as designers, implementers and
evaluators (Hayman, 2012) but if the locals engaged rep-
resent a cosmopolitan social elite there is a risk that such
interventions will simply mirror those that would nor-
mally be designed by outsiders. This is one of the con-
cerns at the heart of Mohan’s appeals not to conflate
elite and grassroots voices as an imaginary homogenised
‘local’ when he writes, “grassroots development…seeks
to move the focus away from elite perspectives to those
of the marginalized. It also opens up the question that
if we can ‘hear’ these non-elite voices, will new social
forms unfold?” (2006, p. 165). The challenge of working
with elites was noted by staff within the PLP—the agency
that funded GGLC—who noted that donor agencies pro-
viding support to local elites is suitable for some devel-
opment initiatives but not all. On certain issues where
the status quo needs to be disrupted, such as women’s
rights, driving change is easier with the support of local
elites but their co-option needs to be managed carefully
so as not to further marginalise activists or be met with
fierce resistance (Denney & McLaren, 2016).
At the heart of the concern related to the extent
to which elites should be centred in locally led devel-
opment interventions is the fear that elite voices will
drown out those of the non-elite at grassroots level and
use their influence to bolster their own status or finan-
cial position. As Paffenholz writes of elite involvement
in peacebuilding: “Elites use the state as well as other
hybrid governance arrangements as sources of income,
power and legitimacy, penetrating these structures with
the explicit aim of undermining them for the sake of
their ownwell-being” (2015, p. 864).With corruption be-
ing a site of significant concern in Pacific states (Corbett,
2015a, 2015b), elite led development initiatives risk be-
ing seen as fronts for personal gain. Concerns of cor-
ruption, nepotism and the general use of political influ-
ence to improve personal ends are problematised by de-
velopment initiatives such as GGLC, though. By avoid-
ing project-based interventions it is unclear how mem-
bers would strategise for their involvement to reap per-
sonal dividends. What benefits are there for elites in pro-
moting an opaque vision of development? That mem-
bers remained engaged for years despite limited aware-
ness and acknowledgement of their influence in shaping
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development planning documents at sub-national and
national levels (Craney & Hudson, 2020) demonstrates
that themembers of GGLC areminimally concernedwith
personal gain through their involvement in the initia-
tive. Either this or they have poor political nous—which
is highly unlikely given their established reputations as
leaders. Interestingly, when an earlier draft of this arti-
cle was shared with some GGLC members for comment,
one remarked that the exclusivity of only engaging lead-
ers was at least partly motivated by a belief that if cit-
izens saw trusted local leaders advocating for reforms
then they would be more likely to support such efforts.
It is worth noting that matters of legitimacy and
whether GGLC represents a case study in grassroots-
engaged development or in elite capture of concepts of
locally led development are not the concern of GGLC, it-
self. Again, this exposes a differentiation between how
development efforts are framed by outsiders such as
donors, evaluators and academics as opposed to by lo-
cal persons embedded in development work through all
facets of their lives. The members of GGLC recognise the
exclusivity of the Coalition, but view this positively as a
means through which members can develop their lead-
ership skills and bemotivated by the broad shared vision
that they hold for a developmental future that is locally
led and environmentally sustainable. Multiple members
described to me that the annual meetings address a lack
of space in the Pacific for leaders to engage in critical re-
flection and peer mentorship with one saying, “I don’t
think we have enough of those opportunities to critique
ourselves.” Another member remarked:
The Coalition is a space of people who believe in the
same cause andwho are engaged in different fora, but
can come together in that space to discuss common
issues, like common environmental issues, that we as
the Pacific are facing.
They also recognise that exclusivity risks limiting their im-
pact in the longer term. To address this, they do not ex-
press intentions to invite new members who do not ex-
hibit leadership traits or to include leaders that are not
seen to share their sense of purpose. Rather, they iden-
tify and offer mentoring to emerging leaders. This was
reflected by a member who advocated “identifying po-
tential leaders…as early as university” for mentoring by
Coalition members with the potential to include them
in the talanoa space. Given the hierarchical nature of
most Pacific cultures, it is worth noting that some of the
younger members who attended annual meetings that
I observed expressed that sharing a space with estab-
lished leaders was initially “very daunting,” viewing these
leaders as “very seasonedprofessionals” but that they be-
came comfortable with support from these established
leaders. One member told me that she was pulled aside
during a tea break and advised: “[To] just speak my mind
and not to worry.” It is also worth noting that while men
comprise approximately two-thirds of the membership
of GGLC—with rotating membership making it impossi-
ble to determine fixed numbers—there is a rough gender
parity amongst younger members. This reflects both the
increasing influence women leaders are having in the re-
gion compared to even the recent past and also an aware-
ness from the secretariat of the benefits of a more di-
versemembership base. Contrastedwith thesemeans by
which GGLC appears to promote greater inclusivity in its
recruitment practices, onemember cautioned against ex-
panding the selection criteria for membership too much.
They stated that the Coalition needed to continually con-
sider: “Being a little bit careful about how inclusive you
are, so that it doesn’t dilute the level of conversation,
because we don’t achieve our goals if that’s the case—
you’re constantly trying to bring them up to speed, etc.’’
By foregrounding diplomacy and networking as tools
to achieve developmental ends GGLC explicitly engages
the elite status of its members. This is not a collective
that is seeking to pass itself as a grassroots organisation,
nor does it seek to deny space for grassroots voices in de-
velopmental processes outside of its own work. Rather,
it has worked to include the perspectives of grassroots
citizens at times, such as in the formulation of a devel-
opment plan for the Ha’apai region of Tonga (Craney &
Hudson, 2020). If there is any consideration that GGLC,
as a locally led development initiative, presents itself
as representative of grassroots voices this is a misrep-
resentation made totally on the behalf of the individ-
ual’s imagination.
6. Conclusion
In recent years the push for development practices that
are led, owned and delivered by locals has moved be-
yond an ethical philosophy to a concept that has gained
favour as likely to lead to more effective and sustain-
able development outcomes (Andrews, Pritchett, Samji,
& Woolcock, 2015; Booth & Unsworth, 2014; Hayman,
2012; McCulloch & Piron, 2019). Coupled with the prac-
tice of a growing number of international NGOs relocat-
ing head offices from Western satellites to developing
country bases (Williams, 2018), it is clear that the future
for designing and implementing development initiatives
must andwill be driven by people at the local level. Never
has this seemed more pertinent than in the shadow of
the global Covid-19 pandemic, which has demonstrated
that human movement across international borders is
not as free as it previously seemed and that the engage-
ment and embeddedness of foreign actors can be dis-
rupted at short notice. This necessitates an increased
focus from donors and multilateral organisations about
how they can best support development initiatives that
are genuinely locally led, owned and driven.
Definitions of locally led development remain
opaque, though. Are all initiatives that include the par-
ticipation of local peoples—of whatever status and to
whatever extent—examples of locally led development?
Should participation be representative of a broad swathe
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 4, Pages 191–200 197
of communities or will inclusion of limited subsets of the
population suffice?
This is an issue for consideration of donors and mul-
tilateral organisations muchmore so than for local devel-
opment actors—elite and non-elite, alike. Supporting lo-
cally led development should not be an exercise of fund-
ing initiatives advanced by local citizens followed by tick-
ing a box related to engaging the voice of locals. True
support for locally led development requires an acknowl-
edgement of the plurality of voices at local level and con-
certed effort needs to be made to capture the voices of
peoples from different walks of life. Hayman’s (2012) vi-
sion of Local First development that captures perspec-
tives from a cross-section of society offers some guid-
ance in how to achieve this in a way that seeks to em-
power the political capital of the broader community
rather than just relying on the political capital of al-
ready established leaders to promote change (Booth &
Unsworth, 2014). Further, commitment to locally led de-
velopment includes being aware of whose participation
is not being included and why, recognising that some
voices may not need to be included while others should
be but cannot for various reasons.
The example of GGLC demonstrates the need for for-
eign agencies to critically contemplate who is meant by
‘the local’ and how a diversity of voices and experiences
are captured. The example of GGLC should be under-
stood as complex and not representative of other lo-
cally led development initiatives. Unlike most initiatives,
it does not support specific projects, have fixed goals or
operate with a staff reliant on donor funding for their
livelihood. Further, it needs to be recognised that the po-
litical and economic context that it operateswithin is spe-
cific to its locality. The smallness of Pacific states makes
discussions about elite capture and locally led develop-
ment in the region very different from similar conversa-
tions in large and very large states.
In this article I do not attempt to offer a set of guide-
lines for what local leadership should look like and who
it should involve. Neither am I interested in providing
a judgement on the extent to which GGLC presents as
locally led and representative of Pacific communities.
Instead I seek to highlight the important point that who
and what is considered as local leadership is dependent
on context, content and the subjective concerns of those
engaging with ideas of local leadership from practical or
philosophical perspectives.
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